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Abstract
We revisit a recently introduced agent model [ACS 11, 99 (2008)], where eco-
nomic growth is a consequence of education (human capital formation) and innova-
tion, and investigate the influence of the agents’ social network, both on an agent’s
decision to pursue education and on the output of new ideas. Regular and random
networks are considered. The results are compared with the predictions of a mean
field (representative agent) model.
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1 Introduction
Recent theoretical macroeconomic growth models emphasize the ultimate sources
of growth. In these so called ’endogenous growth models’, the long-run rate of
growth depends on a set of parameters that describe some inner characteristics
of the economy. These characteristics may be connected to preferences (e. g.
the relative importance of future consumption), to some technological restric-
tions (e. g. the shape of the aggregate production function), to demographic
factors, to the degree of economic openness, to the quality of institutions, and,
last but not least, to the ability of producing and adopting innovation, usually
related to education and research and development activities.
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An important fraction of agent-based models in the economics literature con-
cerns innovation and diffusion processes ([1] – [5]). Some of these relate to eco-
nomic growth in an evolutionary economics perspective, as in the seminal work
of Nelson and Winter [6]. The latter emphasized some of the neoclassical the-
ory drawbacks concerning the modeling consistency between microeconomic
technical change and macroeconomic approaches to growth. The evolutionary
approach seeks then a successful combination of the micro and aggregate pic-
tures, usually resorting to computer simulation modeling approaches. In what
concerns economic growth models, Arau´jo and St. Aubyn’s [7] approach, which
we develop here, innovates within the evolutionary economics based endoge-
nous growth literature. They were pioneer in relying on ideas-based macroe-
conomic growth and on the education decision and outcome interactions and
dynamics among agents, and not so much on the more usually described lo-
cal innovation processes that swell through the economy. In their endogenous
growth model ideas or inventions are the main growth engine. These ideas are
non-rival, in the sense that they can be used by some without diminishing
the possibility of its use by others. Examples relevant to economic growth are
easy to find – the power engine, electricity, or the computer come almost im-
mediately to mind. Ideas are produced by skilled labor, as proposed by Jones
[8]. Arau´jo and St. Aubyn’s model, however, departs from more conventional
approaches in what concerns the way the skilled fraction of the labor force is
determined. In their agent-based approach, individuals are subject to inter-
action or neighborhood effects, and the decision to become educated depends
not only on an economic reasoning, but also on a degree of social conditioning.
As it will become clear later, the skilled or educated share of the population
is a key factor in what concerns the economy’s rate of growth.
Networks of interacting agents play an important modeling role in fields as di-
verse as computer science, biology, ecology, economy and sociology. An impor-
tant notion in these networks is the distance between two agents. Depending
on the circumstances, distance may be measured by the strength of interaction
between the agents, by their spatial distance or by some other norm express-
ing the existence of a link between the agents. Based on this notion, global
parameters have been constructed to characterize the connectivity structure
of the networks. Two of them are the clustering coefficient (CC) and the char-
acteristic path length (CPL) or geodesic distance. The clustering coefficient
measures the average probability that two agents, having a common neighbor,
are themselves connected. The characteristic path length is the average length
of the shortest path connecting each pair of agents. These coefficients are suffi-
cient to distinguish randomly connected networks from ordered networks and
from small-world networks. In ordered networks, the agents being connected
as in a crystal lattice, clustering is high and the characteristic path length
is large too. In randomly connected networks, clustering and path length are
low, whereas in small-world networks [9], [10] clustering may be high while
the path length is kept at a low level. Starting from a regular structure and
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applying a random rewiring procedure (to interpolate between regular and
random networks) it has been found [9] that there is a broad interval of struc-
tures over which CPL is almost as small as in random graphs and yet CC is
much greater than expected in the random case and a small-world network is
obtained. An alternative way to generate a small-world network is by adding
a small number of random short-cuts to a regular lattice.
A small characteristic path length and very high clustering are found in real
social networks, together with a non-uniform distribution of node connectiv-
ities. Other distinctive features of this type of networks are positive degree
correlations (assortative mixing) and the existence of a community structure
[11], [12].
In the present paper, we investigate the role of the network of interactions in
the model introduced by Arau´jo and St Aubyn [7]. The aim is to clarify to
what extent the conclusions of [7] depend on the simplified topology of agents
interactions assumed in that work. We have simulated the model on networks
with some of the features described above, namely on regular square lattices,
classical random (Erdo˝s-Re´nyi) graphs as well as small-world networks. An
analytical study of the model, using a mean-field-like approximation, is also
presented.
The original model definitions and results are reviewed in the next section. In
section 3 we present the mean field results. Simulations on random networks
are detailed in section 4, and section 5 is devoted to a discussion of the results.
Conclusions are presented in the final section.
2 Arau´jo and St Aubyn’s model
In the model economy introduced in [7] there is a constant population of N
individuals (agents), who live for two periods of time; each individual is a
junior in the first period and becomes a senior in the second period of his
life. There is generations overlap and one further assumes that at any time t
there are N/2 juniors and N/2 seniors. Agents are either skilled or unskilled;
an unskilled junior is part of the unskilled labor force, whereas a skilled junior
is a student who postpones joining the (skilled) labor force until he becomes
a (skilled) senior. Unskilled juniors will later turn to unskilled seniors.
Denoting respectively by Js(t), Ju(t), Ss(t) and Su(t) the total number of
skilled juniors, unskilled juniors, skilled seniors and unskilled seniors, one has
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Js(t) + Ju(t) =Ss(t) + Su(t) = N/2 (1)
SS(t) = JS(t− 1) (2)
Su(t) = JU(t− 1) (3)
and the total number of unskilled workers is
U(t) = Su(t) + Ju(t). (4)
Individuals live at fixed positions in space – which is taken in [7] as a one-
dimensional regular lattice with periodic boundary conditions.
One may then represent the state of agent i (i = 1, ...N) by a ’microscopic’
variable σi which takes one out of four values; σi = 0 (skilled junior), σi = 1
(unskilled junior), σi = 2 (skilled senior) and σi = 3 (unskilled senior).
At fixed time intervals (periods) the states of all agents are updated simul-
taneously, according to deterministic rules. Agents in junior states turn into
the corresponding senior state (0 → 2, 1 → 3); an agent in a senior state
is replaced by either a skilled or an unskilled junior, depending on the re-
sult of a ’decision rule’. The decision of a junior agent to follow education is
determined both by imitation of his neighbors (neighborhood effect) and by
external information (concerning the relative wages of skilled and unskilled
workers). According to model [7], a ’newborn’ agent i will become a student
if there is a weighted majority of skilled agents in his neighborhood. More
precisely σi = 2, 3→ 0 if
rw(t)Ss(i)(t) > Su(i)(t) (5)
where Ss(i) (Su(i)) is the number of senior skilled (unskilled) neighbors of agent
i and rw(t) is the relative weight of the skilled, given by
rw(t) ≡ α′
ws(t− 1)
wu(t− 1)
. (6)
In (6) ws (wu) denotes the skilled (unskilled) workers’ salary and α′ is an
external parameter, accounting for a bias towards education and corrections
due to discount rate [13]. A larger value of α′ may represent a positive bias
towards education and/or that the future is less valued. If condition (5) is not
fulfilled, agent i becomes an unskilled junior (σi = 2, 3→ 1).
Production
Skilled (intellectual) and unskilled (manual) workers have distinct roles in the
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model economy: intellectual workers produce ideas whereas manual workers
use existing ideas to produce final goods. Denoting by A(t) the present stock
of ideas, the final production function Y (t) is written as
Y (t) = A(t)U(t). (7)
New ideas are created according to
∆A(t) ≡ (A(t)− A(t− 1)) = A(t− 1)(δSs(t) + γD(t)) (8)
with
D =
1
Ss
∑
i 6=j
1
dij
dij denoting the distance between skilled seniors i and j. When γ > 0, the sec-
ond term in (8) yields a reinforcement of the output of ideas if skilled workers
are close to each other – γ (≥ 0) is hence called the team effect parameter.
Parameter δ is related to skilled labor marginal productivity.
The total income Y is distributed as wages and split between unskilled and
skilled labor forces, Y (t) = Yu(t) + Ys(t). The share of each class of workers is
assumed to be the result of a social pact [14] and is given by
Ys(t) = ∆A(t)U(t) (9)
Yu(t) = A(t− 1)U(t), (10)
yielding individual salaries
ws(t) =
Ys(t)
Ss(t)
= (A(t)− A(t− 1))
U(t)
Ss(t)
(11)
wu(t) =
Yu(t)
U(t)
= A(t− 1). (12)
The current value of the relative wage w ≡ ws
wu
is taken into account whenever
a new agent makes his choice regarding education (eq. 5). Notice that, in the
absence of team effect (γ = 0),
rw(t) = α′δ U(t− 1) (13)
– thus the existence of a large number of unskilled workers is a stimulus to
education.
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It is easily seen from eqs. (7) - (12) that the dynamics described above has
two trivial absorbing states: U = 0 and Ss = 0. The former case implies a
collapse of the economy (Y = 0) due to over-education – no manual workers
exist – and may be avoided by a modification of eqs (9) and (10) [7]. The
outcome is less severe when Ss = 0, in which case one gets a stagnation of
the economy (∆Y = ∆A = 0), a situation referred to as the poverty trap. The
system’s asymptotic state depends on parameter values and also on the initial
configuration of agents. When it does not collapse to an absorbing state, a
finite system may reach a nontrivial fixed point, with a constant number of
skilled and unskilled workers; more often, the asymptotic state is characterized
by a stationary number of unskilled workers, while the number of skilled ones
oscillates between two values – see Figure 1 (a). This is a consequence of the
somewhat artificial junior to senior updating rule [15]. Still, one may argue
that the appropriate time unit is a generation (equal to two periods) and
consider a state where observables are constant along generations a ’steady
state’.
In [7] an initial state is generated, with a pre-assigned ratio of skilled to un-
skilled workers, randomly placed on a ring of size N . Fixing the size of the
neighborhood (eq. 4) and the values of the exogenous parameters, a baseline
and several scenarios were considered. In each case, equations (5) - (12) were
iterated till a ’stationary state’ was reached, and the process was repeated for
other realizations of the initial state. A segregation of educated and unedu-
cated agents in separate domains was observed, specially when team effects
were taken into account – see Figure 2. The team effect also yielded higher
economic growth and qualification, usually together with lower relative salary
levels for skilled workers. The steady state was found to depend on the ini-
tial number of intellectual workers, a poor concentration of educated agents
leading to lower growth rates and lower percentage of skilled workers.
3 Mean field (representative agent) approach
In the model described above, the evolution of the economy is directly deter-
mined by the overall numbers of skilled and unskilled workers (and by their
relative positions if the team effect is considered). The random initial position
of the four types of agents is the sole source of stochasticity in the model,
since for a particular distribution of agents in space, the decision (to study or
not to study) is predictable.
In mean field approximations, one neglects fluctuations of the microscopic
variables and replaces the detailed form of their mutual interactions by the
interaction of a single microscopic variable with a uniform ’mean field’, which
depends on the state of the system. In the present case, neglecting the differ-
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ences in the local neighborhood would lead to one of the two trivial outcomes,
’all educated’ or ’all uneducated’. One can, however, obtain a related non triv-
ial model, within the mean field spirit, by considering a single representative
agent who takes the decision of whether or not to follow education stochas-
tically, with relative probabilities depending on the total number of skilled
to unskilled workers at that time. In this mean field model (MF) one has
uniform initial conditions (or neighborhood) and probabilistic decision mak-
ing, instead of the random initial conditions and deterministic decision of the
original model. More specifically, we set
Js(t)
Ju(t)
=
ps(t)
1− ps(t)
, (14)
where ps is the probability that a junior decides to study, and assume the de-
cision probabilities depend on the weighted ratio of skilled to unskilled seniors
ps(t)
1− ps(t)
= rw(t)
Ss(t)
Su(t)
= rw(t)
Js(t− 1)
Ju(t− 1)
(15)
(t ≥ 1; rw is the relative weight given to the skilled, as before). Substituting
eq. (15) into eq. (14) one obtains a deterministic nonlinear equation [16] with
a stable nontrivial solution, as shown below.
A recursion relation is easily written for R(t) ≡ Js(t)
Ju(t)
:
R(t) = λ
N
2
(
1
1 +R(t− 1)
+
1
1 +R(t− 2)
) R(t− 1) (16)
where λ is the product of the education bias by the efficency of skilled workers
(λ ≡ δα′). Provided Ju(0) 6= 0, this equation has stationary solutions R
∗ = 0
or
R∗ = λN − 1, (17)
independent of initial conditions. From equations (14) - (17) one easily gets
the following (MF) stationary values:
relative wages
w∗ = 1/α′ (18)
number of unskilled workers
U∗ = 1/λ (19)
number of skilled workers
S∗s =
N
2
−
1
2λ
(20)
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growth rate
∆Y/Y = δ S∗s . (21)
The requirement U∗ ≤ N puts a limit on parameter values: λ ≥ 1/N . The fact
that the stationary number of unskilled workers is independent of N (eq. (19))
is obviously a spurious result of the mean field approximation! The prediction
for the other observables is, however, not far from the simulation results for a
regular lattice – see Table 2 – suggesting that, in the absence of team effect,
the model introduced in [7] is well approximated by the mean field model,
exception made of the steady state growth rate dependency on initial values.
4 Simulations on complex networks
The ring topology used in [7] is obviously a simplified description of the struc-
ture of the social interactions between agents. The mean field approach, on the
other hand, assumes that the underlying network is a complete graph where
each individual is influenced by all the others – which is only a good approx-
imation for well-mixed populations. In this section we present the results of
model simulations on more realistic social networks.
As described in section 2, agents live on the nodes of a network, which we call
the influence network, since a ’newborn’ agent is influenced by his neighbor-
hood on this network, in his decision concerning education. When team effects
are considered (see eq. (8)), the output of ideas is enhanced if the ’distance’
between pairs of skilled workers is small. This distance may be the euclidean
one on a regular lattice or the shortest path along links of a random network.
One may even consider a collaboration network among senior skilled agents,
distinct from the underlying influence network. Take for example a situation
where education is decided on a family/local neighbors basis, whereas intellec-
tual workers collaborate with colleagues from a distant town by e-mailing or
indirectly through mutual acquaintances. This case can be modeled by taking
a square lattice (with a neighborhood of size z = 4 or z = 8) as influence
network, plus a small-world for the collaboration network.
Regular lattices
A comparison was made between the results for a ring and a square lattice
with periodic boundary conditions and the same number of neighbors (z = 4
or z = 8).
Random networks
• classical random graph (CRG)
In each run, a connected graph was generated withN vertices and L = Nz/2
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edges through a random graph process: a randomly chosen pair of vertices is
linked by an edge and the process is repeated till the pre-defined number of
edges, L, is obtained (disregarding graphs with self-loops or multiple edges).
• small-world networks (SW)
Taking a ring or a square lattice as ’mother lattice’, short-cuts between
randomly chosen nodes were added with (small) probability P per regular
link of the underlying lattice (L′ = LP short-cuts). We have considered the
following cases: i) only the influence network is SW (the additional random
links are only relevant for the education decision), ii) only the collaboration
network is a SW (only senior skilled agents may get additional random links)
and iii) both networks are SW. The addition of random links is repeated
every half generation, so a senior agent keeps the regular contacts he had
while a junior but is free to establish new short-cuts, and a newborn junior
does not inherit random links.
In our simulations we have used N = 400 agents and chosen parameter values
which yield reasonable stationary growth rates (we verified that a change in
parameter values does not produce qualitatively distinct conclusions). A cali-
bration was done using mean-field equations (17) - (21), assuming a 3% annual
growth rate with a half generation of 25 years (or ∆commentMFY
Y
= 1.0938) and
fixing U∗ = N/2. One obtains the baseline parameter values: δ = 0.011,
α′ = 0.45 (λ = 0.005), γ = 0. To study team effects (scenario 5 in [7]) we took
γ = 0.05.
Simulations started with U(0) = N/2 unskilled workers randomly placed on
the network nodes. Averages over up to 1000 samples were taken for each
set of parameters (neglecting samples which collapsed to an absorbing state).
Typical evolutions of the populations of skilled and unskilled workers in single
runs are represented in Figure 1, together with the respective average over
runs, for the case of (a) a ring and (b) a small-world network (case ii), with
team effect parameters. The period-two oscillatory behaviour of the number
of skilled seniors, discussed in section 2, yiels synchronous oscillations of the
product growth rate, but with rather small amplitude (roughly equal to δ =
0.011 times the skilled workers’ amplitude). An illustration of an initial and
final network configurations, where domain formation is evident, is presented
in Figure 3, for the case of a small-world built upon a ring. For the parameter
values used in the simulations, relaxation times varied from about 10 to 300
periods (the relaxation is slower when the influence network is a small-world
with few short-cuts). The overall picture is, however, qualitatively similar for
all types of networks, with or without team effect. Simulation results for the
’steady state’ values of observables are summarized in Tables 1 and 2.
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Fig. 1. Evolution of the number of unskilled workers U(t) (upper curves) and skilled
workers Ss(t) (lower curves) for (a) a ring with z = 6 neighbours, and (b) a small–
world built on the ring with random links added with probability P = 0.03 case ii);
team effect parameters (see text). Symbols (and colours online) represent distinct
runs; the full (black) lines are averages over 1000 runs.
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Fig. 2. Average number of walls (partitions) between domains of skilled/unskilled
agents as a function of time. Ring with z = 6 neighbours, baseline parameters
(circles) and with team effect (crosses).
Fig. 3. Initial (left) and final (right) network configurations – SW case i), random
links added with probability P = 0.03. Nodes represent skilled (black) or unskilled
(yellow) agents on a ring with z = 6 regular links per node (hardly visible) plus
some short-cuts; baseline parameters (see text).
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5 Discussion
Our simulations confirm the statement [7] that, within this model, in the long
run, higher growth rates are associated with higher qualification (more skilled
workers and less unskilled ones) and stronger segregation by educational level.
Usually this also implies smaller (relative) salaries for the intellectual workers.
From Tables 1 and 2, one sees that baseline results are rather similar for a
ring or a square lattice with the same number of neighbors and they also do
not differ significantly for a random graph with the same average degree. In
contrast, a clear increase in qualification is obtained if the influence network
is a small-world (specially for higher P values) [17].
When team effects are taken into account, the effect of random inter-agent
connections is evident from the much higher growth rates and larger fraction
of skilled workers. Since collaboration networks are often found to be scale-
free [18], we also ran simulations where the number of links between senior
intellectuals had a power-law distribution (with exponent 1). Those were not
true scale-free networks, since the number of nodes was just about 160, but
the purpose was to check if significant changes were seen. The results were
very similar to the SW-case iii) with P = 0.1, except for a larger growth
rate (∆Y/Y = 5.85). In the case of regular lattices, team effects are much
stronger in 2d than in 1d (due to the higher clustering of the square lattice),
yielding increased growth/qualification in two dimensions. The tendency for
segregation is stronger on the (more realistic) 2d substract, as shown by the
smaller number of partitions (domains) - see Table 2.
We have run simulations for higher numbers of agents and obtained qualita-
tively the same behavior, but the fraction of skilled workers increases with N ,
leading to higher growth rates. Theoretical endogenous growth models often
display this type of behavior, with larger economies tending to have higher
growth rates [19]. Still, N = 400 is too small for most realistic economies, so
the values presented in Tables 1 and 2 should be taken just as indicative for
the sake of comparison, and not on absolute terms.
6 Conclusion
In this work we have studied a simple agent model [7] designed to explain
how economic growth can be the result of innovation introduced by a fraction
of the population with higher education. The original unidimensional model
was generalized by assuming that agents interactions took place on a more
realistic type of social network.
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The effect of assuming a heterogeneous interaction network may be summa-
rized, in broad terms, as leading to a steady state with higher growth and
qualification and a stronger segregation of skilled and unskilled individuals.
As expected, this is specially notorious when team effects are considered, due
to the shorter average distance between agents.
We have also derived and solved a related mean field model, which is able to
reproduce some important results of the original model (without team effect).
Note, however, that the mean field approximation leaves out the steady state
growth rate dependency on initial values. Also, by assuming heterogeneous
agents, one is able to reproduce cluster formation and to take into account a
team contribution.
It will be interesting to consider a more microscopic version of the model, with
heterogeneous salaries depending on the agent’s productivity (as well as on
overall economic state). The artificial decision rule (5), may be replaced by the
agent making his choice according to the sign of a local field, as usually done
in models of social influence with binary decision [20]. The question is then
how to relate agent variables to production and innovation in an economically
sensible way.
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Table 1
’Steady state’ results for a ring, a small world network (SW) built on the ring (cases
i)- iii) in the text), a random graph (CRG) and mean field (MF). The number of
domains of skilled/unskilled along the ring is shown in ’Partitions’; ’Team Eff’ is
the value of γD in eq.(8). N=400, z = 6, α′ = 0.45, δ = 0.011, γ = 0.05 for team
effect.
Ring SW - Decision SW - Team Effect SW - Dec.+ Team CRG MF
Base Team
p=0.03 p=0.1
p=0.03 p=0.1 p=0.03 p=0.1 Base Team Base
Base Team Base Team
∆Y/Y 0.666 1.79 1.06 2.23 1.09 2.25 2.78 3.33 3.16 3.78 0.67 3.67 1.09
w 3.05 3.20 2.26 2.24 2.22 2.21 3.11 3.09 2.20 2.17 3.05 3.11 2.22
Ss 60.6 104.9 96.8 132.9 99.1 133.1 128.9 136.1 148.3 155.1 61.1 140.2 100
U 277.5 187.3 205.5 133.6 202.1 134.9 141.0 126.3 102.4 89.3 277.4 119.1 200
Partitions 23.1 16.4 14.7 12.4 16.7 15.2 14.3 13.3 11.1 12.1 22.1 12.7 -
Team Eff - 0.635 - 0.770 - 0.765 1.36 1.83 1.56 2.06 - 2.12 -
Table 2
Comparison of ’steady state’ results on 1d and 2d substracts and mean field (MF).
’Partitions’ is the number of clusters of skilled/unskilled on the square lattice; ’Team
Eff’ is the value of γD in eq.(8). N = 400, z = 4, α′ = 0.45, δ = 0.011, γ = 0.05 for
team effect.
Ring Ring/SW -Team Effect Square Square/SW -Team Effect MF
Base Team p=0.03 p=0.1 Base Team p=0.03 p=0.1 Base
∆Y/Y 0.760 1.25 2.04 2.61 0.762 1.92 2.37 2.75 1.09
w 2.79 3.35 3.30 3.28 2.82 3.24 3.01 2.97 2.22
Ss 69.1 81.1 108.6 120.5 69.3 107.4 120.7 128.2 100
U 253.6 230.6 175.7 151.1 256.2 180.9 153.1 138.2 200
Partitions 35.0 31.9 25.9 24.3 9.3 6.7 7.4 7.9 -
Team Eff - 0.357 0.845 1.29 - 0.742 1.04 1.34 -
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